Links to recent Program Video Clips and Articles

From Barbara Rice, Hope With Sudan Board Member

Did you see these recent programs/articles?  This has the media's and Washington's attention.

PBS News hour
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/09/abyei-crucial-in-sudan.html
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/10/sudan-referendum.html
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/july-dec10/sudan_10-18.html
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/10/clock-ticks-toward-sudan-vote.html

NBC
http://allday.todayshow.com/_news/2010/10/10/5266416-ann-curry-george-clooney-visit-sudan

AP via MSNBC
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39822693
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39820981
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39817978

NY Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/22/arts/television/22curr.html
Ms. Curry is on a very short list of American broadcast journalists who have reported even once from Sudan...

:-)
Barbara

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Barbara L. Rice
Marketing Communications
Strategy - Planning - Management

Registration and Polling Staff for Referendum

DRAFT Terms of Reference

Registration and Polling Staff

Southern Sudan Referendum, Out-of-Country Registration and Voting, USA

Duty Station:                          Washington, DC or Omaha, Nebraska or Phoenix, Arizona

Classification:                                     Employee, all-inclusive service fee

Type of Appointment:           Service contract - Registration Staff (approximately) 3 weeks (November 10 – 30, 2010), with possibility of extension by one week to December 7; Polling Staff (approximately) 2 weeks (Jan 5 -18, 2010)

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been mandated by the South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) to organize the Out-of-Country Registration and Voting (OCRV) for people 18 years and older and of Southern Sudanese origin in the United States and seven other countries. The process will consist of in-person voter registration, display of referendum register, and voting.

Under the supervision of the designated IOM OCRV and SSRC staff, Registration and Polling Staff will have the following duties and responsibilities:

1.      As part of a registration or polling team, ensure smooth operation at Voting and Registration Centers, including maintaining order and managing the flow of persons into the Centre, ensuring proper set up and closure of the facility and reporting of daily registration figures;

2.      Conduct voter registration of eligible persons through interviews to establish eligibility and completing relevant registration forms, following determined registration procedures;

3.      Ensure sensitive materials are kept properly secure, and data protection procedures are followed at all times;

4.      If selected as Voting and Registration Station Chairperson, take overall responsibility for operations within the VRS, and supervise all members of the team.  This will also entail taking overall responsibility for the opening and closing of the station, security of registrant and voter data, receiving accredited observers and other monitoring officials, and notifying their designated IOM OCRV manager of any information or activity which might have a bearing on processes; Chairperson assumes full responsibility for accounting for all issued registration material.

5.      Behave impartially and observe confidentiality at all times, in order to support a free and fair registration process;

6.      Report to their designated IOM OCRV manager or trainer for any operational clarification/ issue;

7.      Perform such other related duties as may be assigned.

Desirable Qualifications: A minimum of secondary grade education is expected. Good standing within the community and good communication skills. Ability to work in difficult and demanding environments under pressure.

Languages: Knowledge of Arabic or any indigenous language of Southern Sudan is desirable.  Good English language skills (spoken and written) are also highly preferred.

IOM is an equal opportunity employer. Women are encouraged to apply.

All staffing inquiries and resumes should be emailed to: ssudanocrv.usa@gmail.com

George Clooney & John Prendergast - Another Darfur Can Be Avoided

By George Clooney and John Prendergast  Sunday, October 17, 2010

If you had had the opportunity three months ahead of time to prevent Darfur's genocide, what would you have done?

The world faces such an opportunity today. On Jan. 9, just 84 days from now, the people of southern Sudan and of the disputed region of Abyei -- which straddles northern and southern Sudan -- will vote in referendums on self-determination. If held freely and fairly, these votes will result in an independent, oil-rich Southern Sudan. If not, the catastrophic war between the north and the south that ended in 2005, after 2.5 million deaths, could resume.

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, the man responsible for prosecuting both that war and the Darfur genocide, which has resulted in an estimated 300,000 deaths since 2003, doesn't want to be the one who lost the south. We just returned from a fact-finding mission to Abyei and various points along Sudan's north-south border, where we found that Bashir's regime in Khartoum is doing all it can to undermine the coming referendums in the hopes that they will be postponed or cancelled.

The United States and the international community were too late to prevent the conflagration in Darfur, just as they were too late in Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Congo and Sierra Leone. Usually, the world responds only after wars begin, spending billions of dollars to mop up humanitarian catastrophes.

In southern Sudan, however, the United States has a unique chance to avert war and atrocities. We talked last week to a number of Democratic and Republican leaders, and even in this polarized political environment, all of them strongly agree that more must be done to prevent further conflict in Sudan. It's time now to follow through and to pull the Europeans and America's other partners along with us.

Most Americans have never heard of Abyei. We hope the region does not follow in Darfur's footsteps to become a household name, but it could. An area about the size of Connecticut, Abyei is inhabited mostly by the Dinka, southern Sudan's largest ethnic group. With war again looming, it could become a flashpoint for the world's next genocide. U.S. intelligence officials have already said that southern Sudan is the region of the globe most at risk of mass killing or genocide in the coming year.

Two years ago, the Sudanese army and its allied militias attacked Abyei town and burned it to the ground. When we visited this month, a blind Dinka chief told us about that day. Unlike the straw huts where many of his fellow townspeople lived, his house was made of concrete and bricks, so it didn't burn down. Because he was blind, he stayed behind while most people fled for safety. Four of his nephews huddled with him in his house, hoping to remain undetected. They were not so lucky. The army came and took the four boys away. No more than 30 seconds after they left the house, their uncle heard shots. The boys' bodies were never recovered.

Later in our trip, when we visited a mass grave where hundreds of Abyei's dead were buried, we wondered if those boys were among them.

Over the past 20 years, the regime in Khartoum has armed and politicized the northern communities that border Abyei, using them as a battering ram to drive out residents and ensure control of the area's valuable oilfields. Bashir is reactivating these militias to destabilize the area if things don't go his way in January. This is the same sort of divide-and-destroy tactic he used in deploying the Janjaweed militias to ravage Darfur. Also worrying, the governor of Abyei's neighboring region to the north is Ahmed Harun. Like Bashir, Harun has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for orchestrating war crimes in Darfur.

Will the international community allow Abyei to burn again? Next time, the fire will not be contained to the town we visited. It will ignite a national war, with repercussions throughout the country, including in Darfur, which remains rife with conflict, human rights abuses and insecurity. The Dinka residents of Abyei whom we spoke to were clear about their views. "They better come and kill me in front of my house," one chief told us, "so I can be buried there with honor. We are ready to die for our land."

And, we must note, for what's underneath that land, for what grows on it and for the river that runs through it. As another older Dinka man told us: "We have suffered so much for so long. The oil is a gift for our suffering. We cannot give it away. We just want to feel the winds of freedom."

We met with President Obama last week and found him in command of the facts and seized with the urgency of the moment. Over the past month, his administration has enhanced its diplomatic efforts in support of peace. U.S. proposals on Abyei, however, have led the southern Sudanese to worry that the longtime Dinka residents of Abyei could have their votes drowned out by northern groups being suddenly resettled in the area by the Khartoum government. The United States needs to take a principled stand in support of the Abyei referendum, and it should further step up its diplomacy in pursuit of a grand bargain that would finally address all the issues dividing the north and the south, including the question of who will get to vote in the two referendums, post-referendum arrangements between the north and south (including oil-wealth sharing), border demarcation, citizenship and future relationships with the United States, a matter of great concern to Khartoum.

Sudan presents a Rubik's Cube of interlocking interests, but robust U.S. diplomacy -- including cooperation with the African Union and other partners -- and the right U.S. leverage promise a solution. Bashir and his colleagues want normal relations with the United States, continued access to some of the oil revenues from the south, an end to sanctions against Sudan and some measure of protection from existing and future indictments from the International Criminal Court.
The regime in Khartoum is not like the one in Tehran or, for that matter, the one in Pyongyang: It wants acceptance and legitimacy. The United States and its diplomatic partners can influence Bashir and his administration's calculations over whether to go to war in the south by creating bigger benefits for peace (in both the south and Darfur) and bigger consequences for war than are currently on the table.
Diplomatic opportunities like this one don't come along very often. Right now, the United States has the opportunity to avoid spending billions of taxpayers' dollars on a humanitarian clean-up operation down the road -- and the opportunity to potentially save millions of lives.
"President Bush helped bring peace to southern Sudan five years ago," one southern Sudanese high school student told us at a border point we visited. "It is up to President Obama to help keep that peace."
George Clooney is an actor and a co-founder of Not on Our Watch. John -- Prendergast is a co-founder of the Enough Project and a co-author of "The Enough Moment: Fighting to End Africa's Worst Human Rights Crimes." Tim Freccia is a Nairobi-based photojournalist and documentary filmmaker who covers conflict and crisis

PBS News Hour Interview with UN Ambassador Rice on Sudan

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/july-dec10/sudan_10-18.html

Watch interview by clicking on link which aired on Monday, October 18.

Sudan's Threatened Peace Deal NYT 11-18-10

Editorial

Sudan’s Threatened Peace Deal

Published: October 15, 2010

Time is running out on efforts to avert another civil war in Sudan. A United States-backed deal in 2005 ended two decades of fighting between the Arab Muslim north and the largely Christian south that killed two million people. That deal is now in danger of unraveling if two referendums set for early January do not go forward.

After neglecting the problem for far too long, President Obama and his top aides are pushing both sides to fulfill their commitments to ensure a credible vote and to accept the results. We hope it is not too late.

Voters in the south, which produces most of the country’s oil, are expected to choose to become independent. In the second referendum, voters in the border district of Abyei must decide whether to ally with the north or the south.

Sudan’s president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, has dragged his feet on election preparations. Voter registration is months late. Election officials still must be trained and ballots printed and distributed. The two sides must put up their share of the election costs and resolve an impasse over who gets to vote in Abyei. Other critical issues remain unresolved. South Sudan also has to get serious about creating the structures of a new state.

Mr. Obama and his team vowed to end Mr. Bashir’s rampage in Darfur and to do all they could to ensure peace between north and south Sudan. The president quickly appointed a peace envoy and replaced a punishment-heavy strategy with one that leaned more toward incentives. When Mr. Bashir showed little interest, the policy was allowed to drift.

With activists warning of impending disaster, the administration finally beefed up its diplomatic mission in south Sudan and named a veteran diplomat to help mediate talks that ended without a deal this week and are supposed to resume later this month. President Obama headlined a United Nations meeting last month in which all the major players committed to respecting the “outcome of credible” referendums and holding them on Jan. 9.

But a senior official with the Sudanese government said on Thursday that the Abyei referendum would either have to be delayed or the issue decided in negotiations rather than a vote. This reneges on the 2005 peace agreement and is unacceptable.

The Sudanese government should be able to make a deal with south Sudan — including on sharing oil revenues — that both sides can live with. What it can’t afford is another civil war or more international opprobrium if it is found stealing or stymieing this vote.

Mr. Obama has offered more explicit incentives if Sudan lives up to its commitments — including help with food production, increased trade and eventually an end to all economic sanctions. He and his aides have also threatened more punishments if Sudan does not.

Mr. Bashir has thumbed his nose at an International Criminal Court indictment for war crimes in Darfur. We are not sure what will change his behavior. We are sure that China and the African Union, which have enabled Mr. Bashir for years, need to press a lot harder.

UNPD Southern Sudan Updates - Jobs

August 2010 Volume 2, Issue 8  UN Developent Programme

Sudan’s upcoming referendum, set to take place on 9 January 2011, will be a defining event in the country’s history. It will also be the last major milestone of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), bringing the
interim period to an end in July 2011.  A key priority for the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) is preparing for the post-referendum period. Since 2005, it has worked hard to establish capacities and systems to deliver against the high expectations of its people – notably, the provision of security, law and order and the effective management of public resources. However, it has faced many challenges in doing so due to the considerable skills gaps and lack of institutions that resulted from the long history of war.

Go to jobs.undp.org or sudanjob.net

Opening Address of Salva Kiir to the South Sudan Parliament 10-13-10

Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, First Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan
Opening Address on the Occasion of the Meeting of ‘All Southern Sudanese Political Parties and Leaders Conference’
Juba, Southern Sudan
Wednesday 13th - 15th October, 2010
 Your Excellencies former Heads of State and Government, Presidents Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi of Kenya,
 Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania,
 Thabo Mbeki of Republic of South Africa,
 Distinguished Leaders and Delegates of Political Parties,
 Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
 Representatives of our Development Partners,
 Religious Leaders,
 Representatives of Civil Society,
 Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am delighted to see all of you in this hall this morning and you are welcome as a family of leaders of Southern Sudan and as friends close to the heart of this part of the country. For those of you who may have come to Juba for the first time, feel at home and for those who have frequented us you are always most welcome!
This gathering today is a rare one but critical because of current developments in our country. The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed on January 9th, 2005, is coming to conclusion in a few months. According to this historical Accord, on January 9th, 2011 the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei will vote in referenda to exercise their right to self-determination. The people of Abyei will be voting to join Southern Sudan while Southern Sudan itself will be making the choice of either remaining part of the Sudan or opt to secede and become an independent entity. This is clearly provided for in the CPA and it is not a matter of interpretation.
Distinguished participants, allow me to point out that this august gathering should be a reminder to us that we are members of one family, Southern Sudanese irrespective of political
affiliation, creed, ethnicity, or geographical location. Our destiny is one as a people and we must together work to achieve our common goals. We are all cognizant that throughout our struggle, each and every family has lost a soul if not souls, to whom we must always register our loyalty because without their selfless sacrifices we would not be where we are now.
Distinguished Leaders, you must have heard from the media that I just returned from a long trip to the United States of America, in which I met with various leaders from the US Administration, neighboring countries and other World leaders. I was invited by the United Nations Secretary General in New York, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon and the Security Council, to attend a UN High-Level Meeting on Sudan which was organized at the brink of the UN General Assembly. All the meetings went on well and as you must have already heard and read from the media and press, the full implementation of the CPA up to the timely conduct of the referenda on January 9th, 2011 received international overwhelming support. This has been due to clarity of our message: we want peace and no more to war! The right to self-determination of the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei must be honored in a referendum to take place on January 9th, 2011. This is the bottom line and a hard won right whose ultimate price is more than 4 million lives lost during the long two civil wars since independence in 1956.
This was my message everywhere during the visit and I also expressed words of gratitude to all the friends without whose altruistic support the CPA could not have become a reality. Remember it is the pressures from far away that also contributed immensely to the signing of the CPA. Thus, as we gather here today, we should not lose sight of the much needed support of the region, the international community, civil society organizations, the Churches and all people of goodwill. Such continued interest and support remains critical more than ever in the testing months ahead.
Distinguished Leaders, the CPA remains the vital foundation of peace today, and will remain so in the months ahead. When we met in Nairobi for the first time in early 2005 we all pledged to support and protect the CPA by signing the covenant. We recommitted ourselves here in Juba in 2008 to abide by the rules and we are coming to its conclusion in a period less than one year. During this period we shall be faced with the challenge of organizing the referenda, that of Southern Sudan and Abyei, and to also press for the implementation of the Popular Consultations for the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states.
The challenges ahead should constitute the agenda for discussions in the next three days. Therefore, I would like to point out the following:
1. This meeting is about the future of Southern Sudan, which is greater than the interest of each and every one of us as individuals and as political parties. We want to
build consensus in order to guarantee a free, fair, transparent and peaceful referendum exercise throughout Southern Sudan and Abyei. This is our collective responsibility as a people and Southern Sudan belongs to all of us.
2. We want to enlighten Southern Sudanese eligible voters to fully understand the process and the decision they will make in the exercise of the right to self-determination. Thus, there is need to stand together as Southern Sudanese to educate our people fully about the importance of this event because unlike elections that constitutionally occurs on term basis this exercise is once and for all in a life time. It is a golden opportunity that must not be wasted for history will not only honor us but this generation of leaders will never be forgiven by future generations.
3. It is such deep thought and understanding that brought me and brother Dr Lam Akol together last Saturday 09/10/2010 as you saw it in the media and press. Political differences should not become obstacle to the general public good and interest.
4. Similarly, I also declared amnesty for all those who took up arms after the elections like Gen George Athor and also for members of Other Armed Groups (OAGs) of Gen Gordon Koang Chol and Gen Gabriel Tangginya. They should all lay down their arms and join Southern Sudanese in this historical event so that together we collectively determine our destiny.
5. Politically, we are a democratic system of government embedded in our Interim Constitution. No one should ever be mistaken to contemplate that we may be gathering here to abolish political parties. No! Even attempts to merge political parties should be discouraged save for legitimate alliances that are based on synergy. The main objective for gathering here together as Southern Sudanese leaders from various political parties is to build the much needed consensus about the future of Southern Sudan.
6. Following the UN High-Level Meeting on Sudan in New York, there has been meeting of minds worldwide as you may have heard from the pronouncements of various leaders about the timely conduct of the referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei. Now if such consensus has already been built at the international level why would Southern Sudanese leaders opt to contradict the future of their people?
7. I am convinced that you will all agree with me that the destiny of Southern Sudan belongs to all the people of Southern Sudan. If Southern Sudan secedes in the forthcoming referendum it will not be a nation that belongs to one party, region, ethnic group, or religion but to all of us. If we squandered this opportunity, we will remain in the wrong annals of history and the likelihood of many lives being lost is high because the emotions of the people are charged. This therefore morally demands for responsible leadership and some level of sacrifice.
8. I would like us all to come up with common principles and together agree to facilitate peaceful, free, fair, timely, efficient and democratic process. This is critical to
determine the credibility of the outcome acceptable to all, particularly meeting the standards of the international community. It is in our interest to ensure credible referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei.
Distinguished Leaders, as I make these statements, I am conscious of the fact that after the elections feelings were hurt because there are those who won and they celebrated and those who lost they agonized and even led to some individuals taking up arms. In the spirit of reconciliation I appeal to all of us to forget the past and let us seize this moment to take the collective responsibility to guarantee the future of our people. At this hour, we must pass the test of unity and nationhood so as to prove many wrong especially those who floated the idea of Southern Sudan becoming a failed state.
Moreover, having differences of opinion does not necessarily disqualify a people from determining their future. Therefore we should live beyond the petty quarrels for survival. We have an opportunity to show to the world that we are ready and I have pointed it out in the past that Southern Sudan is more prepared than some African countries at independence with the exception of South Africa. You will agree with me that no drop of blood should be shed again because of the divisions and disunity amongst us Southern Sudanese. Life is precious and sacred and it should not be sacrificed for the selfish aims of political leaders. I also urge all of us to remain vigilant and guard against war mongers who have not and will not even touch the gun in their life time. I appeal to the gallant armies of the Sudan and all able bodied persons to shun war and value life of their children, women and the old in society. I would like us to honor our distinguished African leaders present here with us today by resolving never to be divided again!
Today, we are left with less than 88 days to reach the vital moment of our history, an extraordinary moment indeed in the history of Africa, January 9th, 2011 the day of the conduct of the referendum in Southern Sudan. We must not let the enemies of peace and spoilers to disrupt the momentous event. As I said, the referendum is a golden opportunity for us and let us work together to let our people make an informed choice of either unity of the Sudan or secession. A leveled ground should be provided for all options during the campaign for unity and secession. Therefore, I want to urge all of us here that our unity and consensus is very critical for the realization of this goal.
Distinguished Participants, as we look forward to this historic event, I ask that we work harder to overcome any limitations in order to fulfill the obligation of letting our people to exercise the right to self-determination. The measure of credibility of the vote should be clear and understood beforehand. I have assured the international community that we are working for a vote that will represent fairly the views of the people. This should be the measure of the
legitimacy of the process. It is not realistic, however, to demand perfection but it is in our interest that a free, fair and transparent process is put in place.
As I said several times, to us the timing of the referenda is Devine. We are pleased and welcome the referendum timeline issued by the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC). We as Government of Southern Sudan will fulfill our financial obligations to the Commission to enable the process proceed without any further delays.
At this juncture, allow me now to explain to you about our preparations. The Government of Southern Sudan is preparing the referendum process at the same time negotiating the post referendum arrangements. We have approached these negotiations with seriousness and good intentions. We are genuinely willing to negotiate with our brothers in the North, and are prepared to work in a spirit of partnership to create sustainable relations between Northern and Southern Sudan for the long-term.
It is in our interest to see that the North remains a viable state, just as it should be in the interest of the North to see Southern Sudan emerge a viable one too. We have been negotiating fairly and consistent with international law. We will work to preserve and enhance the livelihoods of all Sudanese people, including those depending on traditional migrations across the North/South border. The issues are very clear and should not be made to become obstacles for the conduct of the referenda. These are issues dealing with Citizenship and nationality; Natural resources and financial matter; Security; and International treaties. They have been elaborated several times in the past and I will not dwell again to belabor myself. What is required is a mutual agreement that is satisfactory to all but with consideration of justice. We believe that there is a very real opportunity to demonstrate how two states can work together cooperatively to bring economic prosperity to both of their nations in the event of secession.
I would like to emphasize about the safety and rights of Southerners in the North and safety and rights of Northerners in the South, as well as for the peoples who have traditionally traveled through the border areas, to be fully protected. On our side, I have reiterated that we are committed to provide and guarantee adequate security for all Sudanese in a manner that respects the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of all individuals, no matter what their tribe, origin, religion, party or ethnicity. We look for a reciprocal commitment from our brothers in the North.
I cannot end my opening remarks without pointing out the issues of Abyei, where stability now and in the future depends. I urge our partners to implement the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) decision. We do not want Abyei to become the potential trigger for conflict again between the South and the North. The SPLM and the NCP met in Addis Ababa in
the last few days but failed to agree on the way forward on this issue. I mentioned it before and I will repeat again that there is no reverse to war because of the lack of implementation of the Abyei Protocol and other Protocol. Therefore let us all work for peaceful settlement of all issues so as to guarantee mutual respect and good neighborliness. I have repeated it several times that even if the South secedes, it will not relocate from where it is located now.
In conclusion, As the theme of this meeting is to build consensus on the referendum, I hope that my remarks have laid down some basis of building this consensus. It is my belief that the pillars of this consensus would certainly include:
· Respect for each other - we should respect each other including our political parties, programs and views. Nevertheless the views and ideals of parties should not be those that incite the people or promote hatred and violence.
· The Spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation - let us not look backward but rather focus on the future. We should use past mistakes to perfect future vision. This is what will constitute our maturity, which will in turn be the basis for other people to respect us. Let us forgive one another and pursue common goals and interest to better the livelihood of our people.
· Dialogue is the other pillar - as social beings we will always pursue interests that clash. The only way out is to manage such individual conflict of interest through dialogue and openness. Never harbor or accumulate differences because they will often explode. Share difficulties and seek counsel from your friends in order to avoid unnecessary conflict.
Finally, we are committed to sustainable peace and stability irrespective of the outcome of the referendum. We have achieved a lot in the past few years since the CPA was signed, but we still have a lot of work before us after the referendum. We are committed to establishing transparent and accountable government consistent with the requirements of statehood. We will uphold democratic principles and guarantee all kinds of freedom for all our diverse communities. I urge you all to work with us to ensure that these ideals and goal are achieved.
As Southern Sudanese, together let us defend the rights of our people and Long live the CPA!
Long live the memories of our martyrs!
We remain committed to freedom and peace for our country, the region and the world!
I now declare this Consensus Conference opened.
Thank you for listening and May God bless us and bless Southern Sudan!

George Clooney yells 'fire!' about Sudan - Washington Post 10-14-10

George Clooney yells 'fire!' about Sudan

George Clooney says he recently found himself sleeping overnight in a small hut in southern Sudan. A sign inside offered some blunt advice: If the structure catches fire, run outside and shout, "Fire, fire!"
On Tuesday Clooney came to Washington to do just that. In meetings with President Obama, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Council on Foreign Relations, he did his best to raise the alarm about what threatens to be the world's bloodiest crisis in 2011 -- not Afghanistan or Iraq, but Sudan.
The huge African nation hasn't gotten much attention in the last couple of years, since the warfare and humanitarian emergency in Darfur somewhat subsided. But now a new, potentially even bigger crisis looms. On Jan. 9, a referendum will almost certainly mandate a declaration of independence by Southern Sudan, a large, oil-rich region populated mostly by Christians and animists that fought a two-decade long civil war with the mostly Arab and Muslim north before a 2005 peace deal.

The peace accord mandated the upcoming referendum. But the Sudanese central government, led by the indicted war criminal Omar Bashir, strongly opposes southern independence. Preparations for the referendum are running far behind schedule. Border disputes between the two sides have not been resolved, including control over a key oil-producing region. Both the north and the south have been using oil revenues to stock their armies with tanks and other heavy weapons.
So the danger is clear. "If we do nothing, if we turn our backs and walk away, 100,000 people, half a million people, a million people are going to die," Clooney said to a packed house at the Council on Foreign Relations. "We can either do something now, or come in afterward when there is a terrible mess to clean up."

Clooney recently joined the council, an organization mostly composed of corporate movers and shakers, foreign policy makers, and journalists; he's undoubtedly the only member who can brag, as he did Tuesday night, that "I was the two-time sexiest man alive." But unlike some Hollywood celebrities who dabble in international affairs -- Brad Pitt comes to mind -- Clooney comes across as serious and well-informed about his issue. He has traveled to Sudan several times; he just returned from a trip to the south with John Prendergast, one of the foremost Western experts on the region, who is a co-founder of the Enough Project.
The two concluded, as Prendergast put it, that "it is late, but not too late" for the United States and other nations to prevent a new war. The Obama administration neglected the issue until recently; having vowed in Oct. 2009 to pursue a carrots and sticks policy aimed at Bashir, the administration did little to follow up.
However, Clooney and Prendergast said they found Obama seized with the issue when they met with him and several of his senior advisers at the White House Tuesday. "You could feel the energy when we walked in that room," Clooney said. "It's palpable in the room -- it's, 'let's get on with this.' In the middle of a very political season, he [Obama] is involved. He knows all the things that we know and we were just there."
"President Obama a couple of months ago asked a lot of questions [about Sudan] and didn't like the answers," Prendergast said. "He lit a fire." A new special envoy, Princeton Lyman, has been dispatched to the region to join Scott Gration, the somewhat controversial former general who has worked the Sudan issue for Obama. An interagency group at the White House is meanwhile holding regular meetings to determine how the United States can advance the goal of a peaceful referendum and a settlement between north and south.
So what can the administration do? Clooney and Prendergast advocate a stronger mix of incentives and disincentives for Bashir. They point out that much stronger sanctions are possible, including the targeting of bank accounts and companies linked to the regime and its senior figures. More controversially, they say the United States should be prepared to normalize relations with Bashir and even consent to the suspension of his indictment by the International Criminal Court, if he makes peace with both southern Sudan and Darfur.
In the worst case, Prendergast said, the United States should be prepared to prevent the North from using its air force to indiscriminately attack the civilian population of the South, as it did in Darfur. That implies military intervention.
Though he spent the day meeting high level officials, Clooney said one of his aims was to motivate as many average citizens as possible to contact the White House and Congress and support aggressive U.S. action to prevent a war. "I don't think of myself as a journalist and don't pretend to be a journalist," he said. "My job is to show up, because cameras follow me. That is the best way to spend my celebrity credit card."
Clooney's alarm is a real one -- and "it''s a relief," as he put it, that Obama has focused on it. But preventing a war in Sudan at this late hour will not be easy -- nor will be marshaling support among Americans for an intervention in yet another Muslim nation. "I can be a polarizing figure, too," the actor said. If Sudan gets ugly, so might the debate on what to do about it.

Episcopal Church Resources "A Season of Prayer for Sudan"

For a variety of resources from the Episcopal Church go to: http://episcopalchurch.org/sudan.  This site will be continually updated.

Sudan delegation meets with UN secretary general, 'raises alarm'

By Lynette Wilson, October 11, 2010

[Episcopal News Service, New York] An ecumenical delegation of Sudanese religious leaders met with U.N. officials and Secretary General Ban Ki-moon Oct. 11 to express its fear of what might happen if the Jan. 9 referendum in which south Sudan is expected to vote for independence from the north is not carried out as planned. "We told him we came to raise an alarm to the United Nations," said Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul of the Episcopal Church of Sudan during a press conference held at the Church Center for the United Nations, following a day of U.N. meetings.
"We are the church, we are on the ground. We are with the people. And we are knowing every thing that is happening on the ground there. So because of that we are here," Deng said.
The ecumenical delegation is in the United States on an awareness and advocacy campaign in advance of the referendum. The archbishop was joined at the press conference by Roman Catholic Auxiliary Bishop Daniel Adwok Marko Kur of Khartoum; Roman Catholic Bishop Emeritus Paride Taban of Torit; and the Rev. Ramadan Chan, general secretary of the Sudan Council of Churches.
The referendum is the final provision of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005 by the two warring parties -- Sudan People's Liberation Movement in the south and the north's Khartoum-based Government of Sudan. The CPA ended a 21-year civil war -- fought by the Arab and Muslim north and rebels in the Christian-animist south -- that killed more than 2 million people and displaced an estimated 7 million more.
"Our fear is going to come if the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is not implemented accordingly, and that is going to be disaster in the country," Deng said. "And the people that are going to die are going to be innocent. And for us at the church we are always careful and mindful for those who cannot speak for themselves."
Deng explained that there is little time left between now and Jan. 9, and the delegation's visit is a signal to the United Nations, those who signed the CPA and the countries that supported the CPA, that many "things" have been left undone, he said.
The northern government has been criticized for not living into the terms of the CPA, and some believe it is deliberately trying to stall the vote, or that it may try to manipulate the outcome.
"There are some fears that the referendum will not take place because the north is not happy," said Chan, the general secretary of the Sudan Council of Churches. "The southerners, you know, are ready to go forward with the referendum because they feel it is a democratic chance and a constitutional chance for them to exercise their rights in determining their political destiny … so any delay is not in favor of anybody, especially the south."
"We feel that if these things are not done properly, it may take the country back to violence and war, which as churches we are not for," he added.
The CPA also calls for equal oil revenue sharing between north and south (oil revenues account for 95 percent of Sudanese export revenues and 65 percent of government revenues, according to the International Monetary Fund); fair demarcation of north-south boundaries; and resolution of citizenship issues.
Tension already is building in the north and south, but mostly in the north, said Adwok, the Roman Catholic auxiliary bishop of Khartoum.
"The north doesn't want the south to secede," he said, adding the north also doesn't want to stop its oppression of the south.
Adwok stressed that the south's freedom to vote for self-determination is a human rights issue.
"At this juncture, in the third millennium, I don't think anybody can really be expected to remain in slavery when people all over the world are fighting for independence, self expression and democracy," he said.
The delegation has two other major areas of concern: that the will of the people be carried out in the transitional areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains (Southern Kordofan) and Blue Nile; and that the safety and human rights of the internally displaced southerners living in the north be protected.
U.N. officials and Ban assured the delegation that they would have representatives in every county of south Sudan to monitor the referendum and that they are mobilizing U.N. protective forces, said Deng.
Deng also made reference to a recent visit by a U.N. Security Council team to Sudan.
"That is an assurance to our people that the U.N. is here this time," he said.

In addition to meetings with U.N. officials in New York and a panel discussion hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations later this week, the delegation's 12-day awareness and advocacy campaign includes a visit to Washington, D.C., where they will meet with government officials and take part in an interfaith prayer service.
"We are sitting here as the body of Christ, people of faith. We are looking for divine support. Not only political but divine support … we are also appealing to our brothers and sisters in the Lord that they accompany us with their prayers," said Taban, Roman Catholic bishop emeritus of Torit.
In mid-September, Presiding Bishop Katharine Jefferts Schori called on Episcopalians to observe "A Season of Prayer for Sudan."
At the close of the press conference, Jefferts Schori addressed the delegation.
"I am very grateful for your presence here and I want you to know that the people of the Episcopal Church and many, many other churches in this country and the other countries where the Episcopal Church is praying for you, are working to mobilize their governments to join in ensuring peace in Sudan," she said. "We understand that it is an enormously difficult situation and we are in awe of your faithfulness."
The Episcopal Church of Sudan and the Roman Catholic Church in Sudan represent two of the largest non-government organizations in southern Sudan. The Episcopal Church has 31 dioceses, 26 of them in the south. The Roman Catholic Church operates two archdioceses -- one in the north, including one diocese, and one in the south, including eight dioceses.
Deng and Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams met Oct.7 with officials in the U.K. Government's foreign office to provide updates on the situation on the ground in Sudan and to ensure that the U.K. government plays a crucial role in supporting peace and stability in Sudan.
On Oct. 10, Deng preached at a late morning Eucharist at Trinity Church, Wall Street.
The Episcopal Church's long-standing support for Sudan is manifested through its partnerships and companion diocese relationships, programs supported by Episcopal Relief & Development, and advocacy work of the Office of Government Relations.

-- Lynette Wilson is an ENS staff writer.

Sudan Armed Foreces (SAF) Provocation in Abyei Town

Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Provocation in Abyei Town

Dear Peace-Loving People of the Sudan

Greetings from Juba,

The Sudanese Government through their Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has started to provoke our people in Abyei Area.

 

Lt. Gen. Kuol Diem Kuol, SPLA Spokesman

Picture by Larco Lomayat

 

The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has been building up troops around oil fields at Difra (Kech in Dinka), Nyama, Karasana and Heglig. According to reliable sources to our Gallant SPLA forces; the SAF intention is to invade and occupy the Abyei Area and parts of Unity State.

Please open the attached PDF document; A Press Release number 39 from  the Office of the SPLA Spokesman, General Headquarters in Juba; signed by the SPLA Spokesman, Lt. Gen. Kuol Deim Kuol.

God bless you all and stay vigilant.

Comrade Larco Lomayatdit

Juba, South Sudan

George Clooney - NBC News Clip 10-11-10

George Clooney: Civil war in Sudan 'can be stopped'
Making a Difference: George Clooney, a long-time activist on the plight of the people of the Darfur, returns to the region to raise awareness of rising tensions there. NBC's Ann Curry reports.

(Disregard the 15 second advertisement before the video begins)

 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032619/vp/39622101#39622101

Tensions Rise Ahead of Sudan Vote- WSJ 10-11-10

• 

• AFRICA NEWS
• OCTOBER 11, 2010

Tensions Rise Ahead of Sudan Vote

• Text

By JOE LAURIA

Associated Press

A southern Sudanese man covers his heart during a rendition of a proposed national anthem at a selection contest Sunday. The semiautonomous region is set to vote on independence in January.

KHARTOUM, Sudan—Strident words between leaders in Sudan are ramping up tensions in Africa's largest country ahead of a vote on the south's independence, as ambassadors from the United Nations Security Council returned to New York Sunday after an inconclusive diplomatic mission.
Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir on Sunday warned of a "more dangerous war" than the previous one if outstanding issues between the sides—such as demarcating the border, and sharing oil revenue and the waters of the Nile River—weren't resolved before the vote, scheduled for January.
"Such a conflict could be more dangerous than the one that took place before the peace agreement," Mr. Bashir said, the official Sudanese Suna news agency reported.

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He was referring to the second Sudanese civil war that raged from 1983 to 2005, in which two million people are believed to have died.
The north and south have fought two civil wars lasting a total of 43 years.
Mr. Bashir's remarks came after Salva Kiir, the president of semiautonomous southern Sudan, asked the U.N. ambassadors to deploy peacekeepers along the disputed border with the north, where each side accuses the other of amassing troops. A Western diplomat said the U.N. would consider such a step if it were formally proposed.
Mr. Kiir also has warned of violence if a credible vote isn't held on the "sacrosanct" date of Jan. 9.
He said the south was prepared to declare independence through a referendum of its own if the vote didn't go ahead as scheduled.
Numerous technical difficulties have jeopardized the vote. Registration won't begin until Nov. 14. It will run until Dec. 4, allowing just three weeks for registration, and a month for challenges from either side. Voter eligibility remains a thorny issue: Only southerners can vote, even if they live in the north, while northerners living in the south are ineligible.
Determining who is a southerner based on tribal affiliations has proven difficult in some cases for U.N. electoral officials in the approach to the vote.
Turnout must be 60% for the vote to count, so U.N. officials fear the north might want to inflate the rolls to increase the number of votes. Northern officials told the U.N. they are committed to a credible ballot.
The U.N. has a mounted a diplomatic effort to avoid bloodshed, and it has 10,000 peacekeepers already deployed to implement the 2005 peace agreement, which calls for the Jan. 9 referendum that would determine whether the south remains part of Sudan or secedes.
The battle over the south's possible independence is being watched closely by the rest of Africa.
At a meeting of African and Arab leaders in Libya on Sunday, Libyan strongman Moammar Gadhafi warned that southern Sudan's independence would spread like a "disease… to all of Africa," Reuters reported. "Africa needs foreign investment and stability. With this precedent, investors will be frightened to invest in Africa."
U.N. diplomats are trying to ensure a peaceful vote. Some of the visiting diplomats said they believe war in Sudan could be averted if the referendum were delayed by no more than a month—and only for technical reasons.
But they fear political maneuvering by the north, which is deeply reluctant to lose the most resource-rich part of the country.
Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Karti told the visiting diplomats on Saturday that Khartoum was committed to holding the referendum on time.
But he warned the south not to make any further statements about declaring unilateral independence if the January vote is delayed.
As the council was meeting with Mr. Karti in central Khartoum, a pro-unity rally clashed with about 40 counterdemonstrators from the south just blocks away.
Near Juba, the council visited a U.N.-run academy training young police officers for the referendum and a possibly independent south Sudan. A U.N. official conceded that the south's justice system was hardly developed, with a dearth of judges. Other ministries also may not be ready for independence, diplomats said.
Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., said few new countries are ready to take on the challenges of independence on day one. "Is any state ready to be born out of whole cloth?" she asked.

Kerry-Brownbank Senate Bill

DAV10784 S.L.C.
111TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S. ll
To promote peace, stability, improved governance, and economic development
in Southern Sudan and Darfur, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
llllllllll
Mr. KERRY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on llllllllll
A BILL
To promote peace, stability, improved governance, and economic
development in Southern Sudan and Darfur, and
for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace and Sta5
bility Act of 2010’’.
6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
7 Congress makes the following findings:
8 (1) Sudan has been the scene of terrible conflict
9 in recent decades, including a civil war between
10 North and South that raged for over 20 years and
2
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 genocidal violence in Darfur that has been carried
2 out by government forces and their militias.
3 (2) On August 12, 1993, Secretary of State
4 Warren Christopher designated Sudan as a state
5 sponsor of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Ex6
port Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j))
7 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International
8 Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701
9 et seq.), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act
10 (22 U.S.C. 2780), and section 620A of the Foreign
11 Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2371).
12 (3) United States Government engagement,
13 particularly the work of then Special Envoy for
14 Peace in Sudan, John C. Danforth, in close coordi15
nation with the Intergovernmental Authority on De16
velopment and the Governments of the United King17
dom and Norway, helped the parties to the North-
18 South conflict in Sudan to reach the Comprehensive
19 Peace Agreement (CPA), which, on January 9,
20 2005, brought a formal end to that civil war.
21 (4) The CPA called for wealth and power shar22
ing, national elections, democratic and military re23
forms, specific protocols for border states, the for24
mation of a semi-autonomous government in the
25 South, and referenda on self-determination for the
3
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 South and the territory of Abyei to be held by Janu2
ary 2011.
3 (5) The CPA has maintained the larger peace
4 to date and the parties have made progress on a
5 number of elements of the agreement, but the proc6
ess has not led to a democratic transformation, as
7 called for in the 2005 Agreement, and key issues re8
main outstanding, notably border demarcation and
9 preparations for the 2011 referenda. As the CPA
10 draws to a close, critical questions of post-referenda
11 citizenship and revenue sharing must be resolved.
12 (6) At the same time that efforts were under13
way to solidify peace between the North and South,
14 the situation in Darfur deteriorated so significantly
15 that Secretary of State Colin Powell on September
16 3, 2004, and Congress on September 7, 2004, de17
scribed actions by the National Congress Party
18 (NCP) government and its proxy militias as geno19
cide.
20 (7) According to United Nations estimates, over
21 300,000 people were killed in the conflict in Darfur
22 and over 2,600,000 have been displaced internally
23 while another 250,000 Darfuris have sought refuge
24 in Chad, and these processes of displacement con25
tinue.
4
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (8) On March 29, 2005, and April 25, 2006,
2 the United Nations Security Council issued Security
3 Council Resolutions 1591 and 1672, respectively,
4 condemning the continued violations of human rights
5 and international humanitarian law in the Darfur
6 region of Sudan and, in particular, the continuation
7 of violence against civilians and sexual violence
8 against women and girls, determining that the situa9
tion in Darfur constituted a threat to international
10 peace and security in the region, and calling on
11 member states to take certain measures against per12
sons responsible for the continuing conflict.
13 (9) The United Nations established the United
14 Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2005 and
15 the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation
16 in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2006 with respective au17
thorized strengths of 10,715 and 25,987 troops and
18 police.
19 (10) On March 4, 2009, the International
20 Criminal Court issued a warrant for the arrest of
21 President of Sudan Omar Al Bashir, charging him
22 with 5 counts of crimes against humanity and 2
23 counts of war crimes, and on July 12, 2010, issued
24 an additional warrant for President Omar al-Bashir
25 of Sudan for genocide committed in Darfur.
5
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (11) In Darfur, despite peace agreements be2
tween the government and certain armed groups, in3
cluding the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006
4 and other ceasefire and preliminary framework
5 agreements, instability and violence, including direct
6 conflict between and among armed groups and the
7 government and militias, continues with ongoing ci8
vilian casualties and displacement, and the griev9
ances that sparked the Darfuri rebellion as well as
10 the consequences of the genocidal violence carried
11 out and supported by the government remain
12 unaddressed. As stated in the Report of the African
13 Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), ‘‘En14
suring stability in Darfur requires a political proc15
ess, in which due attention is paid to the inter-con16
nected pillars of peace, justice, and reconciliation.’’
17 (12) In response to the crisis in Darfur, the
18 international community, led by contributions from
19 the United States, has undertaken a massive hu20
manitarian operation to provide food, water, sanita21
tion, medical support, and other assistance to the
22 millions of Darfuris displaced or otherwise affected
23 by the violence, an effort that was jeopardized by the
24 Government of Sudan’s expulsion of 13 international
25 nongovernmental organizations in March 2009.
6
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (13) Criminal activity, widespread violence di2
rected against civilians, peacekeepers, and aid work3
ers in Darfur, and an environment of impunity con4
tribute to ongoing instability and jeopardize humani5
tarian assistance, individual and community safety
6 and well being, and opportunities for development.
7 (14) The United States Government provides
8 substantial capacity-building and other assistance to
9 Southern Sudan, but the humanitarian, develop10
mental, and governance challenges remain enormous
11 and have direct implications for the stability of the
12 larger region.
13 (15) Abyei, the subject of the Protocol between
14 the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan Peo15
ple’s Liberation Movement/Army on the Resolution
16 of the Abyei Conflict, and the scene of major vio17
lence in 2008, remains a potential flashpoint and
18 unresolved element between the parties. Serious
19 challenges in the critical north-south border areas of
20 Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan, parts of
21 which are highly militarized, persist, and inter-ethnic
22 tensions, growing dissatisfaction with the slow imple23
mentation of the CPA, and the perceived lack of
24 peace dividends contribute to a volatile situation.
7
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (16) Ethnic and communal violence in Southern
2 Sudan has escalated in scope and intensity, resulting
3 in increasing loss of life and displacement and fur4
ther threatening stability in the region.
5 (17) On February 2, 2010, testifying before the
6 Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, Den7
nis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, stated
8 that a number of countries in Asia and Africa are
9 at significant risk of a new outbreak of mass killing
10 over the next 5 years, but identified Southern Sudan
11 as the area in which ‘‘a new mass killing or genocide
12 is most likely to occur.’’.
13 (18) In April 2010, Sudan held national elec14
tions but the SPLM and other opposition parties
15 withdrew from most contests in Northern Sudan,
16 citing intimidation, voter fraud, insecurity in Darfur,
17 and other factors. The United States Government
18 characterized the elections as not meeting inter19
national standards and marked by circumscribed po20
litical rights and freedoms, reports of intimidation
21 and threats of violence in Southern Sudan, insecu22
rity and ongoing conflict in Darfur, and technical
23 problems, resulting in serious irregularities.
24 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
25 In this Act:
8
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3
mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations
4 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
5 of the House of Representatives.
6 (2) GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN.—The
7 term ‘‘Government of Southern Sudan’’ includes the
8 regional Government of Southern Sudan based in
9 Juba as constituted as of the date of the enactment
10 of this Act and any successor government that—
11 (A) retains autonomy within Sudan or
12 achieves independence as a result of the ref13
erendum called for under the Comprehensive
14 Peace Agreement; or
15 (B) is recognized as an independent nation
16 by the United States Government.
17 (3) MARGINALIZED POPULATIONS OF SUDAN.—
18 The term ‘‘marginalized populations of Sudan’’
19 means—
20 (A) adversely affected groups in regions
21 authorized to receive assistance under section
22 8(c) of the Darfur Peace and Accountability
23 Act (Public Law 109–344; 50 U.S.C. 1701
24 note); and
9
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (B) marginalized areas in Northern Sudan
2 described in section 4(9) of such Act.
3 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
4 It is the sense of Congress that—
5 (1) as affirmed in President Barack Obama’s
6 strategy document, ‘‘Sudan: A Critical Moment, A
7 Comprehensive Approach,’’ of October 19, 2009,
8 ‘‘The United States cannot succeed in achieving our
9 policy goals by focusing exclusively on Darfur or
10 CPA implementation—both must be addressed seri11
ously and simultaneously, while also working to re12
solve and prevent conflict throughout Sudan.’’;
13 (2) the situation in Sudan, particularly in the
14 potentially volatile year ahead, demands strength15
ened diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental
16 efforts by the United States Government and other
17 bilateral and multilateral partners in order to see
18 the CPA through to a peaceful referenda process
19 and outcome, to increase the governance and institu20
tional capacities in Southern Sudan to better meet
21 the needs of the people whether as an independent
22 state or semi-autonomous region, and to help to fos23
ter peace and stability in Darfur;
24 (3) other governments and actors in the region
25 influence the security situation in Sudan and are in
10
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 turn affected by it, thus elevating the importance for
2 the United States Government of working with part3
ners in the region and heightening the responsibility
4 and interest of Sudan’s neighbors and others in con5
tributing to the process to enhance peace and sta6
bility throughout the region;
7 (4) the peace process in Darfur requires the on8
site participation of the organized parties to the con9
flict who are willing to make a constructive commit10
ment to the peace process, the Government of
11 Sudan, and elements of civil society, including
12 women, in negotiations in order to achieve a lasting
13 settlement;
14 (5) United States support for the Darfur peace
15 process would be enhanced by the appointment of a
16 full-time senior official to assist in those efforts;
17 (6) the ongoing rapprochement between the
18 Governments of Chad and Sudan offers an impor19
tant opportunity for larger regional stability and
20 peace;
21 (7) countries with significant economic invest22
ments in Sudan, including the People’s Republic of
23 China, have a vested interest in peace and stability
24 in Sudan and a role and responsibility to work to25
ward that goal;
11
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (8) to prepare for potential outcomes before
2 and after the scheduled referenda on secession, the
3 United States Government should continue to en4
gage with local and international partners in contin5
gency planning, especially to consider ways to help
6 prevent or respond to possible large-scale violence,
7 dislocation, or other humanitarian emergencies;
8 (9) it is critical that the parties to the CPA, as9
sisted by mediators and other witnesses to the agree10
ment, which included the representatives of Kenya,
11 Uganda, Egypt, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the
12 United Kingdom, the African Union, the European
13 Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Develop14
ment (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the
15 United Nations, and the United States, address un16
resolved issues and finalize preparations for the Jan17
uary 2011 referenda, reach basic agreements on key
18 issues, and establish a framework for post-referenda
19 negotiations;
20 (10) while the United States Government is a
21 major contributor to humanitarian and develop22
mental work in Sudan, increased assistance from
23 multilateral, regional, and other bilateral sources will
24 be critical to sustaining peace and promoting hu25
manitarian relief, economic development, and recov12
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 ery, and it is important that the international com2
munity resolve difficulties in the delivery of assist3
ance through multilateral vehicles make a sufficient
4 commitment of food assistance and provide over5
sight;
6 (11) resource management, transparency, ac7
countability, and service delivery are critical compo8
nents of effective governance, and the Government
9 of Southern Sudan and state and local authorities in
10 Southern Sudan, as they continue to receive outside
11 assistance, should demonstrate a commitment to im12
provements in these sectors;
13 (12) in the event that the Government of
14 Southern Sudan achieves independence and is recog15
nized by the United States Government, and in the
16 months leading up to such a potential development,
17 it is important for the Secretary of State and the
18 Secretary of the Treasury to examine the statutory
19 and other sanctions currently applicable to Sudan, to
20 determine how the sanctions regime would be af21
fected by the independence of Southern Sudan, and
22 to consult with Congress on changes that may be
23 needed under such circumstances;
24 (13) in order to increase the diplomatic capacity
25 of the United States Government, facilitate humani13
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 tarian and developmental assistance and oversight of
2 aid, and support efforts of the Government of South3
ern Sudan to improve governance and enhance secu4
rity, the United States Government should maintain
5 the position of a special envoy, appoint a senior offi6
cial to assist with the Darfur peace process, and ac7
celerate plans for construction on additional or ex8
panded facilities and other housing for personnel to
9 support an enhanced United States diplomatic and
10 development presence and to allow for expanded de11
ployment of personnel;
12 (14) the United States Government—
13 (A) recognizes the importance of the
14 UNMIS and UNAMID missions and anticipates
15 the continued need for their presence in the
16 coming years;
17 (B) emphasizes the importance of proactive
18 diplomacy and contingency planning by the
19 international community for Darfur, Southern
20 Sudan, the ‘‘Three Areas’’ of Southern
21 Kordofan, Blue Nile State, and Abyei, and
22 other vulnerable populations, including those in
23 Eastern Sudan, and recognizes the importance
24 of the full implementation of the Abyei Protocol
14
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 and that resolution of Abyei’s status is a crit2
ical element of a sustained peace;
3 (C) notes that UNAMID continues to lack
4 critical enablers, including utility helicopters,
5 and that the absence of such enablers undercuts
6 the ability of the mission to carry out its civil7
ian protection mandate, and notes with concern
8 that UNMIS is facing diminishing aviation re9
sources at a moment when mobility is critical;
10 (D) notes that the mission and potentially
11 the personnel of UNMIS should continue to
12 evolve after the completion of the terms of the
13 CPA in order to maintain its civilian protection
14 function while strengthening its institution15
building abilities; and
16 (E) urges each to pursue its mandate of ci17
vilian protection assertively;
18 (15) key benchmarks to measure progress with
19 respect to the relationship between the United
20 States and Sudan include humanitarian and peace21
keeper access to and within Darfur, committed en22
gagement to resolve the conflict there and uphold
23 justice and accountability, demarcation of borders,
24 adherence to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
25 including holding the referenda for Southern Sudan
15
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 and Abyei as provided for in such agreement within
2 the time provided, and a framework agreement for
3 the resolution of post-referenda issues;
4 (16) in the event of the obstruction of efforts
5 to achieve these benchmarks, additional responses to
6 such obstruction include expanded travel restrictions
7 against individuals responsible for such actions,
8 blocking the assets of such individuals and, as prac9
tical, transactions with the financial institutions that
10 support them, opposition to international debt relief
11 measures, engagement to promote multilateral sanc12
tions, and stricter enforcement of multilateral arms
13 embargoes;
14 (17) in the event of the achievement of these
15 benchmarks, phased and graduated responses in16
clude steps to permit certain forms of trade and in17
vestment in Sudan in specific sectors (other than the
18 petroleum sector), the exchange of ambassadors, and
19 a review of foreign assistance restrictions, economic
20 sanctions, and other statutory provisions; and
21 (18) the full normalization of relations between
22 the United States and Sudan, including support for
23 international debt relief, requires the peaceful imple24
mentation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a
25 comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur that is
16
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 credibly implemented, sustained improvement in se2
curity and services that improve living conditions in
3 Darfur, including humanitarian access, full coopera4
tion with UNAMID and UNMIS, a cessation of all
5 support for international terrorism, and credible and
6 locally supported efforts to achieve accountability,
7 justice, and reconciliation, as consistent with existing
8 United States law and the terms of relevant United
9 Nations Security Council resolutions.
10 SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
11 It is the policy of the United States—
12 (1) to support efforts to help create a more
13 democratic, accountable, and inclusive government in
14 Sudan that respects human rights, protects civil lib15
erties, and contributes to peace and stability in the
16 region;
17 (2) to promote and work toward a definitive
18 end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and
19 genocide in Darfur, and to promote peace through20
out Sudan;
21 (3) to respond vigorously to efforts that either
22 undermine the credibility of the self-determination
23 referenda provided for by the CPA, undermine peace
24 and stability in Southern Sudan, or prevent the end
25 of the conflict in Darfur, including working with bi17
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 lateral and multilateral partners, including the
2 United Nations, the African Union, the European
3 Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
4 to take appropriate measures in the event of such ef5
forts;
6 (4) to promote and, together with the parties to
7 the CPA and others, to work toward full implemen8
tation of the agreement in such a way that results
9 in a peaceful, unified Sudan or an orderly path to10
ward 2 separate and viable states at peace with each
11 other;
12 (5) in order to help create conditions more con13
ducive to peace, development, democracy, and sta14
bility in Sudan, to—
15 (A) work with nongovernmental organiza16
tions, the Government of Southern Sudan, and
17 other bilateral and multilateral entities to pro18
vide critical humanitarian assistance in South19
ern Sudan and other areas;
20 (B) promote implementation of the CPA
21 by all parties, including the conducting of
22 peaceful and credible referenda on self-deter23
mination in January 2011 and foster commit24
ments from countries in the region, multilateral
18
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 partners, and other key countries to accept the
2 outcome of such a process;
3 (C) support capacity building of the Gov4
ernment of Southern Sudan and that of state
5 and local authorities in the South, including
6 through the possible support of technical advi7
sors, in order to strengthen the abilities of the
8 Government of Southern Sudan to provide crit9
ical services to their people, whether as an inde10
pendent state or semi-autonomous region;
11 (D) assist the parties to the CPA and rein12
vigorate international engagement from regional
13 partners and others, including the People’s Re14
public of China, in resolving post-referendum
15 issues, including questions regarding citizenship
16 and migration, future cooperation in the oil sec17
tor and wealth-sharing, security arrangements,
18 security of border areas, water use, liabilities
19 and assets, and matters of currency and fi20
nance;
21 (E) help the parties to defuse tension in
22 Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile State
23 through successful conducting of the ref24
erendum for Abyei and the popular consultation
25 process for the other two areas, as required
19
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 under the CPA, and the promotion of construc2
tive political engagement to address other con3
cerns in those areas;
4 (F) assist the Government of Southern
5 Sudan in enhancing governance and service de6
livery, reintegrating returnees, strengthening
7 the rule of law, building an effective police force
8 and criminal justice system, helping to trans9
form its security forces into a professional body
10 abiding by principles of civilian rule, protection
11 of human rights, and accountability, reducing
12 corruption, improving transparency, and build13
ing effective political capacity in a democratic
14 environment;
15 (G) assist the Government of Southern
16 Sudan in creating comprehensive controls over
17 small arms stockpiles, clearing landmines and
18 explosive remnants of war, and implementing
19 the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Con20
trol, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light
21 Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the
22 Horn of Africa, done at Nairobi April 21, 2004;
23 (H) promote improved financial manage24
ment within the Government of Southern
25 Sudan;
20
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (I) engage in intense dialogue with key bi2
lateral and multilateral partners to identify con3
crete steps that could be taken multilaterally to
4 respond to actions by the North or the South
5 or any other party that undermines peace in
6 Sudan, interferes with humanitarian relief, im7
pedes future development, or undercuts stability
8 in Darfur; and
9 (J) support viable local efforts to prevent
10 and mitigate conflict and enhance reconcili11
ation, including disarmament, demobilization,
12 and reintegration of remaining militias and
13 other armed groups, including potential hybrid
14 tribunals for acts committed in Darfur as called
15 for by the Peace and Security Council of the
16 African Union; and
17 (6) in order to help create conditions more con18
ducive to peace, the distribution of humanitarian re19
lief, future development, and stability in Darfur,
20 to—
21 (A) promote peace and security for the
22 people of Darfur, including through sustainable
23 peace agreements arrived at with consultation
24 with civil society;
21
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (B) identify and prioritize the filling of
2 gaps in humanitarian assistance by sector, in3
cluding protection, and by access to under4
served populations in need;
5 (C) support international mediation efforts
6 to help create a lasting peace in Darfur;
7 (D) promote simultaneous stabilization ef8
forts where conditions permit while maintaining
9 vital humanitarian assistance;
10 (E) support and enhance the efforts of
11 UNAMID and others to provide civilian protec12
tion, including protection against sexual and
13 gender-based violence;
14 (F) encourage and strengthen initiatives
15 for ending violent conflict;
16 (G) support international efforts, including
17 those of the International Criminal Court, to
18 bring those responsible for genocide and war
19 crimes in Darfur to justice and to work with
20 Darfuri civil society to support locally owned
21 accountability and reconciliation mechanisms
22 that may hasten peace and make it more sus23
tainable;
24 (H) promote livelihood and other opportu25
nities for youth, women, and others;
22
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (I) assist with the rehabilitation and
2 strengthening of ecosystems and natural re3
source management as part of a broader effort
4 to reduce environmental drivers of conflict and
5 enhance rural and urban development;
6 (J) work with key bilateral and multilat7
eral partners, as well as local actors, to develop
8 contingency plans to address potential post-
9 2011 scenarios and humanitarian and other
10 needs; and
11 (K) promote democratic processes and po12
litical reforms at the national and subnational
13 levels that enhance the government’s respon14
siveness to the needs of the people of Darfur.
15 SEC. 6. SECURITY, CIVIL AVIATION, AND POLICE ASSIST16
ANCE.
17 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con18
gress that—
19 (1) security assistance to the Government of
20 Southern Sudan is intended to—
21 (A) assist with the continuing efforts of
22 the Government of Southern Sudan to trans23
form the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and
24 its constituent parts into a more efficient, reg23
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 ular, nonpartisan professional army in accord2
ance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
3 (B) enhance the ability of the Government
4 of Southern Sudan to prevent and respond to
5 internal conflict in order to protect the lives,
6 well being, and property of civilians while civil7
ian police capacities are being built; and
8 (C) enhance the ability of the Government
9 of Southern Sudan to respond to the threats
10 posed by transborder armed groups, such as the
11 Lord’s Resistance Army, maintain its territorial
12 integrity, and promote regional stability; and
13 (2) assistance to the civilian police and criminal
14 justice sector in Southern Sudan is intended to—
15 (A) enhance the effectiveness and account16
ability of the Southern Sudan Police Service
17 and its ability to carry out critical functions of
18 civilian protection and law enforcement, includ19
ing through support for community-based polic20
ing; and
21 (B) support efforts within the judiciary to
22 establish and uphold the rule of law, protect
23 human rights, and ensure due process.
24 (b) SECURITY, AVIATION, AND POLICE ASSIST25
ANCE.—
24
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (1) IN GENERAL.—
2 (A) AUTHORITY.—If the President has not
3 made a certification under section 12(a)(3) of
4 the Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107–245; 50
5 U.S.C. 1701 note) regarding the noncompliance
6 of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
7 Army (SPLM/A) or the Government of South8
ern Sudan with the Comprehensive Peace
9 Agreement for Sudan, the President, notwith10
standing any other provision of law, may, for
11 the purpose of constituting a professional mili12
tary force and strengthening police capabilities
13 to provide civilian protection and uphold the
14 rule of law, authorize the provision of the fol15
lowing assistance to the Government of South16
ern Sudan:
17 (i) Non-lethal military equipment and
18 related defense services, including training,
19 controlled under the International Traffic
20 in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. 120.1 et
21 seq.) if the President—
22 (I) determines that the provision
23 of such items is in the national inter24
est of the United States; and
25
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (II) not later than 15 days before
2 the provision of any such items, noti3
fies the Committee on Foreign Rela4
tions of the Senate and the Com5
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the
6 House of Representatives of such de7
termination.
8 (ii) Equipment and training related to
9 civil aviation infrastructure to promote
10 safety, security, and air navigation in
11 Southern Sudan, if the President—
12 (I) determines that the provision
13 of such items is in the national inter14
est of the United States; and
15 (II) not later than 15 days before
16 the provision of any such items, noti17
fies the Committee on Foreign Rela18
tions of the Senate and the Com19
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the
20 House of Representatives of such de21
termination.
22 (iii) Training and equipment for police
23 forces, including training on human rights,
24 civilian protection, gender-based violence,
25 and the role of security forces in maintain26
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 ing the rule of law. Assistance in this Act
2 may be made available to the Government
3 of Southern Sudan to provide appropriate
4 lethal equipment and training of police if
5 the President—
6 (I) determines that the provision
7 of such items is in the national inter8
est of the United States and appro9
priate oversight and accountability
10 mechanisms exist; and
11 (II) not later than 15 days before
12 the provision of any such assistance,
13 notifies the appropriate congressional
14 committees of such determination.
15 (B) SUNSET.—The authority provided
16 under subparagraph (A) shall expire on Sep17
tember 30, 2014.
18 (2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR SECU19
RITY ASSISTANCE TO INDEPENDENT STATE OF
20 SOUTHERN SUDAN.—For fiscal years 2011 through
21 2014, in the event of the recognition by the Presi22
dent of the State of Southern Sudan as an inde23
pendent country, the President shall notify the ap24
propriate congressional committees not later than 15
27
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 days before obligating any lethal or non-lethal secu2
rity assistance.
3 (3) END USE ASSURANCES.—For each item ex4
ported pursuant to this subsection, the President
5 shall include with the notification to Congress under
6 clauses (i)(II) and (ii)(II) of paragraph (1)(A) and
7 under paragraph (2)—
8 (A) an identification of the end users to
9 which the of assistance is being made;
10 (B) the dollar value of the items being pro11
vided;
12 (C) a description of the items being pro13
vided; and
14 (D) a description of the end use
15 verification procedures that will be applied to
16 such items, including—
17 (i) any special assurances obtained
18 from the Government of Southern Sudan
19 or other authorized end users regarding
20 such equipment; and
21 (ii) the end use or retransfer controls
22 that will be applied to any items provided
23 under this subsection.
28
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (4) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—Section 40 of the
2 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) shall not
3 apply to assistance provided under paragraph (1).
4 SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
5 (a) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING VOTES OP6
POSING LOANS.—Provisions of law that direct the United
7 States Government to vote against or oppose loans or
8 other uses of funds, including for financial or technical
9 assistance, in international financial institutions for
10 Sudan shall not be construed as applying to Southern
11 Sudan or to technical assistance relating to the implemen12
tation and peaceful fulfillment of the Comprehensive
13 Peace Agreement of 2005. The Secretary of Treasury
14 shall submit a notification to the appropriate committees
15 of Congress prior to relying upon the rule of construction
16 set forth in this section to vote for or support a loan or
17 other use of funds.
18 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE19
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit20
tees of Congress’’ means the Committee on Foreign Rela21
tions and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
22 Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af23
fairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the
24 House of Representatives.
29
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 SEC. 8. MEASURE TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND
2 SECURITY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN.
3 (a) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any other provi4
sion of law, in the event that the Government of Southern
5 Sudan is recognized as an independent country by the
6 United States Government and has agreed to a revenue
7 sharing arrangement with Sudan, in order to facilitate the
8 economic development and self-sufficiency of such inde9
pendent country and to promote peace prior to and fol10
lowing the culmination of the CPA, the President may
11 waive the prohibition on the transshipment of petroleum
12 originating in Southern Sudan through the country of
13 Sudan upon prior notification to the appropriate commit14
tees of Congress that the exercising of such a waiver is
15 in the national interest of the United States.
16 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE17
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit18
tees of Congress’’ means the Committee on Foreign Rela19
tions and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
20 Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af21
fairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the
22 House of Representatives.
23 SEC. 9. CONSOLIDATION AND AMENDMENT OF REPORTING
24 REQUIREMENTS.
25 (a) REPORT ON SOUTHERN SUDAN.—Not later than
26 one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
30
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in
2 consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads
3 of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the appropriate
4 congressional committees a classified report, together with
5 an unclassified executive summary, that includes the fol6
lowing:
7 (1) An assessment of progress made during the
8 previous calendar year toward meeting the policy ob9
jectives set forth in section 5.
10 (2) A description of United States Government
11 programs contributing to the achievement of the pol12
icy objectives set forth in section 5, including the
13 amounts obligated and expended on such programs
14 during the preceding fiscal year.
15 (3) An assessment of the levels and nature of
16 violence, human rights violations, and conflict within
17 or involving Southern Sudan, including sexual and
18 gender-based violence and the role played by other
19 governments and actors in the continuation of vio20
lence, and a description of prevention and resolution
21 efforts by the United States Government, the Gov22
ernment of Southern Sudan, civil society, the United
23 Nations, and other parties.
24 (4) a description of incidents which may con25
stitute crimes against humanity, genocide, war
31
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 crimes, and other violations of international humani2
tarian law by all parties to the conflict in Sudan, in3
cluding slavery, rape, and aerial bombardment of ci4
vilian targets.
5 (5) A description, to the degree practical, of the
6 accrual, transparency regarding, and management of
7 oil and gas revenues by the Government of Southern
8 Sudan and of the state of oil production and re9
gional transshipment of oil and gas from Southern
10 Sudan to other markets.
11 (6) A description of transit patterns across bor12
ders between Northern and Southern Sudan and of
13 the status of marginalized populations, including dis14
placed persons from Southern Sudan living in the vi15
cinity of Khartoum.
16 (7) A description of the status of Abyei, if
17 Abyei becomes separate from Sudan as a result of
18 its referendum, and an assessment of the level and
19 nature of conflict in Abyei.
20 (8) A description of the role and size of United
21 Nations peacekeeping missions in Southern Sudan,
22 including conflict prevention and mitigation activi23
ties.
24 (9) A description of efforts by the Government
25 of Southern Sudan to undertake security and justice
32
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 sector reform, including an assessment of the capa2
bilities of the military and civilian police force and
3 progress on implementing both the SPLA Act and
4 the Police Act.
5 (10) A description of United States security as6
sistance provided in the period covered by this re7
port, and a description of any unauthorized re8
transfer or use of security assistance furnished by
9 the United States.
10 (11) A description of efforts by the Government
11 of Southern Sudan to develop accountability mecha12
nisms for the security forces, including the develop13
ment of a military justice system.
14 (12) In all reports except the initial report, a
15 description, sector by sector of the implementation
16 of the Southern Sudan development and stabilization
17 strategy submitted under subsection (b).
18 (b) STRATEGY ON SOUTHERN SUDAN.—Not later
19 than January 31, 2012, the Secretary of State shall sub20
mit to the appropriate congressional committees a multi21
year strategy to provide assistance in support of govern22
ance and the rule of law, humanitarian aid, development,
23 and security in Southern Sudan, including—
24 (1) specific and measurable goals;
25 (2) benchmarks and timeframes;
33
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (3) an implementation plan to achieve the pol2
icy objectives set forth in section 5; and
3 (4) a monitoring and evaluation plan.
4 (c) REPORT ON DARFUR AND OTHER MARGINALIZED
5 AREAS IN SUDAN.—Not later than one year after the date
6 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
7 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
8 Secretary of Defense and other relevant agencies, shall
9 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re10
port that includes the following:
11 (1) An assessment of progress made during the
12 previous calendar year toward meeting the policy ob13
jectives set forth in section 5.
14 (2) A description of United States Government
15 programs contributing to the achievement of the pol16
icy objectives set forth in section 5, including the
17 amounts obligated and expended on such programs
18 during the preceding fiscal year.
19 (3) An assessment of the levels and nature of
20 violence, human rights violations, and conflict within
21 Darfur, including sexual and gender-based violence,
22 and a description of as prevention and resolution ef23
forts by the United States Government, the Govern24
ment of Sudan, civil society, the United Nations,
25 and other parties.
34
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 (4) An assessment of the roles played by other
2 governments and actors in the continuation or pre3
vention and resolution of conflict in Darfur.
4 (5) A description of incidents that may con5
stitute crimes against humanity, genocide, war
6 crimes, and other violations of international humani7
tarian law by all parties to the conflict in Sudan, in8
cluding slavery, rape, and aerial bombardment of ci9
vilian targets.
10 (6) A description of aerial bombardment of ci11
vilians by government forces, capabilities and role of
12 peacekeeping forces in providing civilian protection,
13 and the impact of criminal activity on the security
14 environment for civilians and aid workers.
15 (7) A description of the political status, levels
16 and nature of violence, and other developments with17
in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States.
18 (8) A description of the political status, levels
19 and nature of violence, and other developments with20
in Eastern Sudan.
21 (9) A description of the economic impact of oil
22 exploitation within Sudan and of other sources of oil
23 investment or revenue within the country.
24 (10) In all reports except the initial report, a
25 description, sector by sector, of the implementation
35
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 of the strategy on Darfur and other areas in Sudan
2 submitted under subsection (d).
3 (d) STRATEGY ON DARFUR AND OTHER
4 MARGINALIZED AREAS IN SUDAN.—Not later than Janu5
ary 31, 2012, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
6 appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strat7
egy to support the objectives for Darfur and other areas
8 in Sudan included in this Act, including—
9 (1) specific and measurable goals;
10 (2) benchmarks and timeframes;
11 (3) an implementation plan to achieve the pol12
icy objectives set forth in section 5; and
13 (4) a monitoring and evaluation plan.
14 (e) ELIMINATION OF EXISTING REPORTING RE15
QUIREMENTS.—The Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107–
16 245; 50 U.S.C. 1791 note) is amended—
17 (1) in section 8—
18 (A) by striking subsections (b), (c), and
19 (e); and
20 (B) in subsection (g), by striking ‘‘or (b)’’;
21 and
22 (2) by striking section 11.
23 SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
24 It is the sense of Congress that, of all amounts appro25
priated for fiscal years 2011 through 2014 for the Depart36
DAV10784 S.L.C.
1 ment of State and foreign operations, such sums as may
2 be necessary should be used to carry out activities author3
ized under this Act.